Modeling User Manipulation on Social Media
George T Amariucai
PITS Lab Research
- Privacy metrics for incomplete statistical information.
- Privacy in dynamic environments (time-varying features, social contexts, etc.).
- Security of cyber-physical systems (zero-dynamics stealthy attacks and privacy-utility tradeoffs to thwart them).
- Privacy strategies in online social networks.
User manipulation in social networks
How to define and quantify user manipulation
- First define a manipulation goal. Example: increase the probability that a user engages with (replies to, retweets, etc.) the manipulator’s messages.
- Measures a user's probability of engaging with a post in a neutral environment.
- Measures the degree of deviation of this probability (manipulation gain) when the manipulator specifically targets this user:
– Manipulator optimizes its profile and message features to maximize the target user’s probability of engagement.
User manipulation in social networks
How to defend against user manipulation
1. Privacy-utility tradeoff:
- User modifies the disclosed profile features (some directly, some through trained behaviors) to minimize (1) the probability of engaging with a message (think spam), or (2) the manipulation gain (think advertising).
- User has to maintain a certain level of utility – e.g., the average trust level among his followers.
User manipulation in social networks
We can formulate a problem solvable by gradient algorithms.
1. First build a function (regression) mapping manipulator features, message features and target features to probability of engagement.
User manipulation in social networks![]()
3. Finally, the outer optimization problem:
Note: We cannot formulate a proper minmax problem, as the true probability that the target user engages depends on target’s true attributes, not disclosed ones.
User manipulation in social networks
So how effective is such a manipulation strategy?
- Apparently not very effective
Is there a way to manipulate better?
- We can try a more complex manipulation campaign, consisting of multiple messages.
- But we need a better user engagement model, mapping history to probability of engagement.
The Russian Troll Dataset
- Released by Daren Linvill and Patrick
Warren (Clemson University) in July 2018
- Published on GitHub by FiveThirtyEight, an American data-based news website
- Contains 2,973,371 tweets from 2,848 unique Twitter handles (alleged trolls) connected to IRA (Internet Research Agency)
- Tweets published from 2015 to 2017, collected with Social Studio
The Russian Troll Dataset
We want to study users’ interaction with the trolls; these interactions are still on Twitter.
- Challenge: Troll tweets have been deleted from Twitter. Old tweets do not contain conversation ID, so not possible to retrieve complete conversation threads
- Solution: We looked for tweets that constitute replies to troll handles; we fit them to troll tweets by matching the tweet times. We collected 48373 tweets from 41832 unique users from 2012-02-08 through 2018-05-30.
Spiking-neuron-based modelling
- Model each user as a spiking neuron
- Messages reaching the user act as inhibitory or excitatory post-synaptic
- Potential at the trigger zone P accumulates all the post-synaptic potentials (discounted as appropriate).
- The probability of firing (that is, of the user engaging with a certain message or topic) depends on the difference (P-T) between potential at trigger zone and some firing threshold
Note: P and T are impossible to determine separately, and P amplitude is arbitrary, so we can set T=0.
Spiking-neuron-based modelling
Post-synaptic potentials can be defined in vector form:
- One component (dimension) for each type of feature extracted from the exposure history.
- Features have to be cumulative over the entire history.
- Examples of history features:
- Sentiment – must be decoupled into positive sentiment and negative sentiment
- Popularity of the topics – for example, if a hashtag is present, popularity is the number of tweets, over the past week, that contained the hashtag.
- Counts of words belonging to several word lists – for example, words eliciting hate, words eliciting pity, words eliciting outrage
Spiking-neuron-based modelling
Spiking-neuron-based modelling
Advantages of spiking-neuron-based modelling
- Realistic model of opinion formation
- Allows the study of:
- Optimal complex manipulation strategies (e.g., phase 1 – trust build-up; phase 2 – manipulation attempt);
- Manipulation strategies coordinated over a network of users, with multiple colluding trolls;
- Various social media phenomena, like echo chambers, formation and mutation of ideas, etc.
A big “Thank You” to the graduate students who did this work:
Abiola Osho and Adaeze Okeukwu